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Abstract
Designing and implementing security-critical systems correctly is very diﬃcult. In practice, most vulnerabil-
ities arise from bugs in implementations. We present work towards systematic speciﬁcation-based testing of
security-critical systems based on UMLsec models. We show how to systematically generate test sequences
for security properties based on the model that can be used to test the implementation for vulnerabilities.
We explain our method at the example of a part of the Common Electronic Purse Speciﬁcations (CEPS),
a candidate for an international electronic purse standard.
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1 Introduction
Modern society and economy rely on infrastructures for communication, ﬁnance,
energy distribution, and transportation. These infrastructures depend increasingly
on networked information systems. This leads to vulnerabilities, for the exploitation
of which there have recently been a number of widely publicised examples. Correct
design and implementation of security-critical systems that are part of an open
network is a diﬃcult task. In practice, most vulnerabilities arise from bugs in
implementations. It would be highly desirable to gain conﬁdence in the protection
of implemented security-critical systems against attacks.
Towards this goal we present work for systematically testing security-critical sys-
tems. The idea is to specify the system (at the abstract design level) using a formal
speciﬁcation language and to use this speciﬁcation to generate test-sequences to ﬁnd
security weaknesses in an implementation in a systematic way. More speciﬁcally,
we use UMLsec [11,12] to specify the unlinked load transaction of the Common
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Fig. 1. Model-based Security Engineering
Electronic Purse Speciﬁcations (CEPS) [5]. We use this speciﬁcation to generate
test-sequences for implementations of the protocol. CEPS is a candidate for a glob-
ally interoperable electronic purse standard supported by organisations (including
Visa International) representing 90 percent of the world’s electronic purse cards,
making its security an important goal.
As well-known, testing cannot prove the absence of implementation errors. It is
however currently the technique most widely used in industry to gain some conﬁ-
dence in the absence of major bugs, since mechanically assisted theorem proving or
model-checking of code have thus far been perceived as being limited in the size of
treatable systems and as being comparatively costly.
The eﬀectiveness of testing depends crucially on the ability to identify adequate
test strategies. This is very diﬃcult when testing for security requirements, since
it is not suﬃcient to establish that no failures will occur most of the time, as the
remaining, non-tested situations that lead to failures must be assumed to be found
by motivated attackers and then be systematically exploited. Rather, one needs
to establish that certain security-critical parts of the system are indeed free from
failures under all conceivable attack attempts from the system environment. The
current work aims to provide some guidance on how to do this in a systematic way.
The work presented here is part of a more general approach towards model-based
security engineering visualized in Fig. 1 (see [11]).
In Section 2, we give an overview over the Common Electronic Purse Speciﬁ-
cation, specify the part under consideration and explain the security threat model.
In Sect. 3 we explain our use of the UMLsec tool to generate test-sequences that
examine the security of the above speciﬁcation. In Sect. 4 we refer to related work.
We end with a conclusion and indicate further planned work.
2 CEPS
We give an overview over the Common Electronic Purse Speciﬁcations. Stored value
smart cards (“electronic purses”) have been proposed to allow cash-free point-of-
sale (POS) transactions oﬀering more fraud protection than credit cards: Their
built-in chip can perform cryptographic operations which allows transaction-bound
authentication (whereas credit card numbers are valid until the card is stopped,
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which enables misuse). The card contains an account balance that is adjusted when
loading the card or purchasing goods. The Common Electronic Purse Speciﬁcations
(CEPS) deﬁne requirements for a globally interoperable electronic purse scheme
providing accountability and auditability. The speciﬁcations outline overall system
security, certiﬁcation and migration. For more detail on the functionality of CEPS
cf. [5].
Here we consider a central part of CEPS, the (unlinked, cash-based) load trans-
action, which allows the cardholder to load electronic value onto a card in exchange
for cash at a load device belonging to the load acquirer. The participants involved
in the transaction protocol are the customer’s card, the load device and the card
issuer. The load device contains a Load Security Application Module (LSAM) that
is used to store and process data (and is assumed to be tamper-resistant). During
the transaction, the account balance in the card is incremented, and the amount is
logged in the LSAM and sent to the issuer for later ﬁnancial settlement between the
load acquirer and the card issuer. Load transactions in CEPS are on-line transac-
tions using symmetric cryptography for authentication. We only consider unlinked
load, where the cardholder pays cash into a, possibly unattended, loading machine
and receives a corresponding credit on the card. Linked load, where funds are
transferred for example from a bank account, the so-called funds issuer, is viewed
as oﬀering fewer possibilities for fraud, because funds are moved only within one
ﬁnancial institution [5, Funct. Req. p. 12].
To perform a cash-based load transaction, the cardholder inserts his card into
the card reader and the money into the cash slot of the load device. To load the
cash on the card, he enters the PIN. Note again that the cardholder is not able
to communicate with the card directly, but only through the display of the load
device. A Load Secure Application Module (LSAM) is used to provide the necessary
cryptographic and control processing. The LSAM may reside within the load device
or at the load acquirer host. The load acquirer keeps a log of all transactions
processed. Through the load host application, the LSAM communicates with the
card issuer. Below, we analyze the load protocol between the card, the LSAM, and
the card issuer that is executed after the cardholder inserts the cash.
Speciﬁcation: We give a speciﬁcation of the CEPS load transaction, slightly
simpliﬁed by leaving out security-irrelevant details, but including exception process-
ing. The speciﬁcation is given in form of the UML subsystem L. Here we show as
fragments the class and statechart diagrams in Fig. 2 to 5. The values exchanged
in the protocol are listed in Fig. 6.
We use the notation var ::= exp as a syntactic short-cut. Here var is a local vari-
able not used for any other purpose and exp may not contain var . Before assigning
a semantics to the diagram, the variable var should be replaced by the expression
exp at each occurrence. Also, for increased readability, we use pattern matching:
for example, (lda′,m′) ::= Init means that when deriving the formal semantics of the
sequence diagram, one would have to replace lda′ with Init1 and m
′ with Init2 in
each case.
The link between the LSAM and the loading device, and the loading device itself,
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Fig. 2. Load transaction class diagram
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Fig. 3. Load transaction: load acquirer
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Fig. 4. Load transaction: card
need to be secured. Otherwise an attacker could initiate the protocol without having
inserted cash into the machine. For simplicity, we leave out the communication
between the LSAM and loading device to determine the amount to be loaded, but
assume that the amount is communicated to the LSAM in a secure way. Here, a
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Fig. 5. Load transaction: card issuer
CEP card name cep is called valid if the name is registered at the card issuer and
not on the list of revoked cards.
For the participants of the protocol, we have the classes Card, LSAM, and Issuer.
Also, each of the three classes has an associated class used for logging transaction
data named CLog, LLog, and ILog, respectivly. The logging objects simply take the
arguments of their operations and update their attributes accordingly.
We assume a sequence of random values rcnt to be given that is shared between
the card C and its card issuer I. These random values are required to be fresh
within the Load subsystem as indicated by the tag {fresh} attached to Load. Note
that when viewing the Load subsystem in isolation, the associated condition is
vacuous: It just requires that any appearance of an expression rcx in Load must be
in Load. Using the {fresh} tag at a top-level subsystem is still meaningful, because
one may want to include the subsystem in another subsystem also stereotyped
〈〈 data security 〉〉, which would extend the scope of the freshness constraint to the
larger subsystem. In this example, it would not make sense to attach the {fresh}
tag with value rc to any of the objects in Load, because the random values are
supposed to be shared among Card and Issuer. As usual, we write rc : Data to
denote an array with ﬁelds in Data. Also given are the random numbers rln, r2ln
and the symmetric keys rn of the LSAM. These values are also supposed to be
generated freshly by the LSAM. In fact, one can see that expressions of the form
rlx, r2lx, rx, for any subexpression x, only appear in the object and the statechart
associated with LSAM. Again, the keys and random values are independent of each
other and of the other expressions in the diagram. Also, again, constant attributes
have their initial values as attribute names and the corresponding attribute types
are underlined. Finally, we are given the transaction amounts mn. Before the
ﬁrst protocol run, the card and LSAM initialize the card transaction number nt
and the acquirer-generated identiﬁcation number n, respectively. Also, before each
protocol run, the card and LSAM increment the card transaction number nt and
J. Jürjens / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 220 (2008) 93–104 97
Variable Explanation
C card
L LSAM
I card issuer
rcnt secret random values shared between card and issuer
rln, r2ln random numbers of LSAM
rn symmetric keys of LSAM
mn transaction amounts
m, rl, hl mn, rln, hln as received at card issuer
nt card transaction number
n acquirer-generated identiﬁcation number
lda load device identiﬁer
cep card identiﬁer
s1 card signature: SignKCI(cep :: lda ::m ::nt)
hcnt card hash value: Hash(lda ::cep ::nt :: rcnt)
ĥcnt hcnt as created at issuer
rc, hc rcnt, hcnt as received at load acquirer
KCI key shared between card and issuer
KLI key shared between LSAM and issuer
mln Signrn(cep ::nt :: lda ::mn ::s1 ::hc ::hln ::h2ln) (signed by LSAM)
hln hash of transaction data: Hash(lda ::cep ::nt :: rl)
h2ln hash of transaction data: Hash(lda ::cep ::nt :: r2l)
s2 issuer signature: SignKCI(cep ::nt ::s1 ::hl)
s3 card signature of the form SignKCI(cep :: lda ::m ::nt)
Fig. 6. Values exchanged in the load speciﬁcation
the acquirer-generated identiﬁcation number n, repectively, as long as a given limit
is not reached (to avoid the rolling over of the numbers).
Security Threat Model: We derive the following security conditions:
Cardholder security: If the card appears to have been loaded with a certain
amount according to its logs, the cardholder can prove to the card issuer that
there is a load acquirer who owes the amount to the card issuer.
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Load acquirer security: A load acquirer has to pay an amount to the card issuer
only if the load acquirer has received the amount in cash from the cardholder.
Card issuer security: The sum of the balances of the cardholder and the load
acquirer remains unchanged by the transaction.
Note that the correct functioning of the settlement scheme relies on the fact
that the cardholder should only be led to believe that a certain amount has been
correctly loaded (for example, when checking the card with a portable cardreader) if
the cardholder is later able to prove this using the card. Otherwise the load acquirer
could ﬁrst credit the card with the correct amount, but later in the settlement
process claim that the cardholder tried to fake the transaction.
Properties to be tested: We turn to the formalizations of the above security
conditions, which should be tested using the model-based testing approach. We
focus on the condition providing security for the load acquirer. According to the
CEPS, the value mln, together with the value rln sent in the CreditforLoad message
to the card, is taken as a guarantee that the amount m speciﬁed in mln has to be
paid by the speciﬁed load acquirer to the issuer of the speciﬁed card, unless it is
negated with the value rcnt [5, Tech. Spec. 6.6.1.6]. The security condition is thus
formalized as follows:
Load acquirer security: Suppose that the card issuer I possesses the value
mln = Signrn(cep ::nt :: lda ::mn ::s1 ::hcnt ::hln ::h2ln) and that the card C possesses
rln, where hn = Hash(lda ::cep ::nt :: rln). Then after execution of the protocol ei-
ther of the following two conditions hold:
• a message Llog(cep, lda,mn, nt) has been sent to l : LLog (which implies that L
has received and retains mn in cash) or
• a message Llog(cep, lda, 0, nt) has been sent to l : LLog (that is, the load acquirer
assumes that the load failed and returns the amount mn to the cardholder) and
the load acquirer L has received rcnt with hcnt =Hash(lda ::cep ::nt :: rcnt) (thus
negating mln).
3 Generating test-sequences
With the help of the UMLsec model, we can now test the resistance of an imple-
mentation of the CEPS load transaction against threats using a speciﬁcation-based
testing approach. For this purpose, test case speciﬁcations based on the system
model have to be formulated. Test speciﬁcations would be, for example, that a
certain log entry should be generated, certain data is sent on the channels, or a
component should reach a success or failure state. The test speciﬁcation and the
model are translated into logic and their conjunction is solved. The solutions are
all test sequences of a given maximum length satisfying the test case speciﬁcation.
These test sequences represent concrete system executions, and can be depicted
as message sequence charts. To test the system, the inputs contained in the test
sequence are fed into the system components and it is veriﬁed if the output is as
expected. Test sequence generation can also be used to validate and correct the
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Fig. 7. Model-based Security Tool Suite
speciﬁcation: if the test sequence itself contains an unexpected system run (e.g.
there should be no execution fulﬁlling the test case speciﬁcation, but the test se-
quence generation computed one), this indicates an error in the model.
For classical speciﬁcation based testing, the main emphasis of testing is on nor-
mal system behaviour (e.g., for certain inputs, the correct result is computed).
When security aspects come into consideration, this is turned around: the system
has to behave in a secure way even in case it is under attack. Thus, in testing we
have to assume that system components may act maliciously.
We did this by including a threat model into the system speciﬁcation: public
channels are vulnerable, and can be accessed and manipulated by an intruder. The
intruder is modelled by a Prolog program which is generated from the UMLsec
speciﬁcation using the UMLsec tool [18,13,10] (Fig. 7).
The Smart Card Protection Proﬁle [7] of the Common Criteria lists the following
threats relevant to fail-safety of a smart-card scheme:
Forced Reset : An attacker may corrupt Target of Evaluation Security Function
(TSF) data through inappropriate termination of selected operations.
Insertion of Faults : An attacker may determine user and TSF information though
observation of the results of repetitive insertion of selected data.
Invalid Input : An attacker may compromise the TSF data through introduction
of invalid inputs.
Environmental Stress : An attacker may introduce errors in the TSF data through
exposure of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) to environmental stress.
Correspondingly, we consider the following two threat scenarios:
(1) the attacker can only pass on the messages or drop message parts (replace them
by Empty)
(2) the attacker can pass on the messages, or replace them by own messages not
containing secret keys he does not know in advance.
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The ﬁrst scenario corresponds to the situation where the adversary may interrupt
the communication between the diﬀerent protocol participants at some point (Forced
Reset, e.g. by pulling out the card). The second scenario models the case that the
adversary may force one of the involved cards to behave in an arbitrary way (by
Insertion of Faults, Invalid Input, or Environmental Stress – such as heat). This may
have the result that the card sends arbitrary messages instead of the intended ones,
which may involve keys stored on the card, but it is unlikely that the misbehaving
card “guesses” unknown keys.
The attacker is generated as part of the generated Prolog program which auto-
matically ﬁnds those attacker messages corresponding to a given test scenario.
Now we can generate test sequences from the speciﬁcation that correspond to
executions when the system is under attack. The main remaining problem is that
we now have a very large number of potential test sequences. As mentioned before,
it is much more diﬃcult to test systems for the absence of undesired than for the
presence of desired behaviour. There are very many executions where the system
fails — which should we choose to cover as many diﬀerent attack situations as
possible ?
A direction to do this is to use the model (states in the automata and transitions)
as a basis for test case speciﬁcation. However, unlike in the general case, we can
take advantage of the fact that we know which parts of the model relate to the
security requirement to provide fail-safety, so emphasis of testing can be focused on
these.
The CEPS speciﬁcations contain the following requirements on the behaviour of
the protocol participants relevant to fail-safety (cf. Fig. 6 for an explanation of the
variables):
(1) rcnt is sent by the card to the LSAM if the card experiences an error.
(2) In case the LSAM experiences an error, either s3 or r2ln are sent by the LSAM
to the issuer.
(3) If there is no response to the s1 sent to issuer, the LSAM must send r2ln.
(4) r2ln is not sent out if the card balance incremented.
(5) The LSAM performs only one of the following two events:
• s2 and rln are sent to the card or
• r2ln is sent to the issuer.
The implementation can be checked wrt. these requirements by generating test
sequences. For example, for the ﬁrst requirement we compute a test sequence from
the model so that rcnt is sent by the card to the LSAM, which corresponds to an
error at the card. This test sequence can then be used to verify if the implementation
has the same behaviour in this case.
Additionally one can consider test case speciﬁcations based on the structure of
the model:
(i) Compute a concrete execution where one of the components reaches the LoadSucc
state. In particular, the test sequence reﬂects the fact that no other component
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Fig. 8. Test Sequence for Load transaction
reaches the LoadFail state (validating the model), and the implementation can
be tested with respect to this.
(ii) Analogous to the above, one can compute test sequences where one of the
component reaches the LoadFail state and verify that no other components
then reach the LoadSucc state, even in presence of an attacker.
(iii) More speciﬁcally, for any of the security-critical transitions to LoadFail or
LoadSucc one may compute test sequences so that this transition is executed.
(iv) One can compute test sequences with respect to attacker activity. E.g. mes-
sages are manipulated at certain points in time or a certain number of times.
The implementation tested in this case-study is a prototypical implementation
of part of the CEPS speciﬁcations in Javacard (consisting of 600 KB of source code
altogether) available from the UMLsec tool website [18]. Due to space restrictions,
a more detailed discussion of the results from this case-study has to be deferred to
a longer version of this paper.
As an example, Fig. 8 shows a test sequence derived from the model correspond-
ing to the class of speciﬁcations (5) given above: the test case is that an r2ln is sent
to the issuer log because of a failure of the card. In this case, s2 and rln are not
sent to the card, and all three components stop together in their LoadFail states.
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The above test sequence consists of 24 steps (executions of transitions) and is com-
puted in approximately 10 seconds by the test sequence generator. Brieﬂy, the test
sequence proceeds as follows: r2ln is sent to the issuer log because of a failure.
In the computed test sequence, the failure occurs after the LSAM sent the Load
message to the issuer. The LSAM sends the message Comp to the card to cancel
the transaction, and the response RespL from the issuer is dropped by the intruder.
The messages RespC with cancellation information are sent from the card via the
LSAM back to the issuer, and all three components report the failure to their logs.
4 Related Work
There has been an increasing amount of work on the interaction between formal
methods and testing, see [3,16,8,2,14,6] for examples and overviews.
The work presented here is an extension of earlier work [19] (which uses the
CASE tool AutoFocus) towards using the UMLsec tool suite. Despite the title,
the paper [17] is not really about model-based testing of cryptographic protocols
in our usage of the term “model-based testing” (i.e., generate test-sequences from
models) but rather about soundness and completeness of symbolic models of crypto-
graphic protocols with respect to computational complexity models, and about using
the SpecExplorer for model-checking Spec-sharp models of cryptographic protocols.
The approach proposed in [15] deals with the problem of establishing whether or
not a security property expressed using an observer formalised as an input/output
labelled transition system (IOLTS) holds in an IOLTS providing a black-box speciﬁ-
cation of the system. The central idea of using a Dolev-Yao based model-veriﬁcation
approach to generate the traces is similar to that followed in [19] (but other tech-
niques are added, such as “learning by testing”). Otherwise, work on model-based
testing of cryptographic protocol implementations against security requirements is
limited. Since the usage of cryptography poses particular challenges, work on test-
ing other kinds of security-critical software (such as database management systems
[4]) is not directly applicable here. Also, since the goal of our work is on testing
high-level security requirements (such as secrecy and authenticity), work towards
ﬁnding buﬀer overﬂow weaknesses in implementations (such as [1]) is not directly
comparable to our work.
5 Conclusion
We used the UMLsec tool support to generate test-sequences for security aspects
of the Common Electronic Purse Speciﬁcations (CEPS) from the UMLsec models.
This gives a systematic way of doing security testing. Since security vulnerabilities
often arise from bugs in the implementation, having a systematic way to eliminate
security-critical bugs is a worth-while goal.
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